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Incident Commander
Related terms:
Industrial Control System
Responder
Fire Department
Incident Command System
Recovery Effort
Unified Command
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Emergency Management – A Brief Introduction
James F. Broder, Eugene Tucker, in Risk Analysis and the Security Survey (Fourth Edition), 2012
Incident Commander
The incident commander has overall responsibility at the incident or event. A distinctive vest that contains the words "Incident Commander" is worn as identification. The incident commander determines objectives and establishes priorities based on the nature of the incident, available resources, and agency (or company) policy.4 The role of the incident commander is usually filled by the first responder to arrive at the scene, who is relieved of this duty when a more senior responder or a designated incident commander arrives. A command post is set up at a safe distance near the location of the emergency where the incident commander will manage the response. Once established, the command post should not be moved unless the conditions of the emergency pose a threat. It can be located in the field, at a vehicle, inside an office, or where reliable communications (electronic and verbal) and security (access control) can be maintained. When appropriate, it should be within view of the incident but away from noise or activity that may interfere with the command efforts.
Management must delegate (ahead of time) to the incident commander the authority to make the tactical decisions necessary to stabilize or end the emergency without interference by those who would normally possess some degree of authority. Management's role is in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to make strategic decisions based on the events or to allocate resources among multiple incidents, generally not at the scene of an incident. Reliable communications between the EOC and incident commander are essential. The incident commander follows preexisting policy set by management and will use standard forms and checklists to ensure that all tasks are completed. Software programs are available to aid in the management of the emergency in the field, but for these tools to work effectively, as we will point our later, they must be practiced and reside on systems that can withstand field conditions and the possibility of limited resources such as electrical power or extra batteries.
Some of the specific duties of the incident commander are as follows:
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Overall field management and responsibility of the emergency
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Coordination with the EOC or other incident commanders. The incident commander of the firm's ERT should co-locate with the fire or police department incident commander (an element of Unified Command).
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Ultimate responsibility for the safety of responders
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Approval of all Incident Action Plans and resources
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Situational analysis
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Setting objectives and priorities
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Delegating authority as necessary
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Primary responder until others arrive
If the size of the emergency warrants the establishment of the following positions, assistants to the incident commander include an information officer, safety officer, and liaison officer.
Information Officer
The information officer, or public information officer (PIO), is the news media or community contact for the event. In a business environment, the public relations representative will fill this role and should be less (or not at all) subordinate to the incident commander, as he or she would be under the government's version.
Safety Officer
The safety officer ensures that regulatory compliance is maintained and develops measures to ensure the safety of all assigned personnel. The safety officer is often responsible for evaluating changing conditions and should have the authority to withdraw responders or to suspend an operation without clearance from the incident commander.
Liaison Officer
The liaison officer assists the incident commander on larger incidents to which representatives from other agencies may respond by coordinating their involvement and providing them with information on conditions, objectives, and resources.
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Design for emergencies
Yuval Bitan, in Design for Health, 2020
The mass-casualty incident management equipment
The need to consider all the aspects of the MCI environment and human operator characteristics during an MCI makes the mission of designing MCI management equipment complex and challenging. The equipment should support the MCI treatment procedure, leading the commander through the three main phases described above. We will examine the equipment the MCI commander is using and demonstrate how it is designed under the constraints of the two other pillars.
The first tool the MCI commander would use is the paramedic field guide. This is a small booklet listing the main protocols paramedics need to follow, and it is used to refresh their memory on specific emergency protocols. Since the guide is small and contains information for varied situations, most paramedics always carry it in one of their pockets, so it will always be handy. Although this might seem like a very low-tech solution for information retrieval, the fact that it can be accessed at any time and under any condition (as long as there is a light source) makes it very suitable for the MCI environment.
In addition to the small field guide the MCI commander would have an MCI kit to support his/her role and provide the paramedics who arrive at the scene with tools designed specifically for MCIs. In order to act as a commander, the paramedic who takes on this role needs to be easily identified and heard. A highly visible vest labeling role (Medical Services Commander) will inform everyone who is in charge. A battery-powered megaphone will assist the commander in communicating commands to other paramedics and rescue teams. To help overcome memory limitations during the high workload, the MCI kit also includes incident command priority protocols with detailed lists of instructions that should be followed during the MCI, along with worksheets and a clipboard.
While paramedics always have to assess their patients' condition, the fact that in an MCI they need to care for more than one patient raises a special need—how to document information about a patient so the next paramedic, who will continue caring for this patient, will have all the information that was already collected about this patient. The MCI kit has two simple tools to assist in delivering these important details. The first is a set of permanent markers, and the second, triage tags in four colors: red (emergency) to mark casualties that need immediate treatment, yellow (urgent) for significant injuries that can tolerate a delay in care, green (nonurgent) for people who can safely wait for treatment, and black for expired casualties. These tags are used to quickly mark casualties' priority after the first assessment. Again, simplicity is an important characteristic in the MCI environment because no special setup is required, and these tools can operate under any conditions. This simplicity also assists the human operator (the paramedic) by serving as a memory aid using a tool that helps in following the MCI protocol (Fig. 8.1):

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Figure 8.1. The MCI triage tags.
The equipment the MCI commander is using follow the few basic design principals we discussed earlier in this chapter:
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They are designed to operate in varied MCI environments, as they are not dependent on resources nor on specific conditions in the environment.
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As these artifacts are not electronic but based on paper and cardboard they are resilient to failure and will function effectively under extreme and unexpected conditions.
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Taking into consideration the human condition during the MCI, they are very easy to operate and serve the operators as a reminder, leading them through the procedures that need to be done.
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13th International Symposium on Process Systems Engineering (PSE 2018)
Hidekazu Hirai, ... Ichiro Koshijima, in Computer Aided Chemical Engineering, 2018
4 Conclusion
In this research, the authors developed the cyber exercise in the form of a computer game for educating incident commanders in CI owner companies. Through workshops with OT and cyber security experts, the developed prototype was successfully evaluated by using the participants' questionnaire. To apply this prototype to each company, it is necessary to customize the data to reflect the situation (such as the organization structure, the jurisdiction scope, the corporate culture and so on) of each company.
At present, however, the complexity of the data integrity makes it difficult to prepare unified template to simplify the customization. Accordingly, we will continue to develop the utility tools to promote our exercise.
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Response Coordination and Incident Command Systems
Nan D. Hunter, in The Law of Emergencies (Second Edition), 2018
On the Ground
Although the overall approach to disaster response can quickly start to sound like alphabet soup, it is not that complicated. An Incident Command System (ICS) is simply a standardized management system that is built on modular units, the complexity of which can be scaled up or down depending on the extent of the problem. It establishes a common structure and vocabulary for all the agencies, at all levels, of government that are involved in a response. It can be used in a situation as simple as that involving several agencies from one jurisdiction—for example, local police and fire departments. Or it can be scaled up to accommodate multiple agencies from multiple jurisdictions, as in a large-scale emergency. NIMS is essentially one kind of an ICS.
Central to the ICS/NIMS approach is the concept of unified command. Unified command, another standardized management approach, means that rather than have a silo-like approach in which each agency or jurisdiction operates independently, a collaborative structure is set up. If police, fire, and social services departments were all responding to a plane crash, for example, representatives from each of those agencies would be working literally together, in the same location (an incident command post), and jointly making decisions, rather than proceeding with each agency issuing directions for the workers within its control without consultation with the other agencies. The lead person on site in charge of an agency's operations would be the agency's incident commander. Together, the incident commanders would make decisions. If no other level of government was involved, then the mayor, for example, might appoint one overall incident commander.
In response to a large-scale disaster, the modular approach would scale up to accommodate the greater complexity and larger number of persons and entities involved. For example, all local agency leaders would report to the local incident commander; all state agency leaders would report to the state incident commander, and so forth. The incident commanders representing federal, state, and local operations would collaborate in the unified command. However, each agency would retain its full scope of legal authority and responsibility.
The Best of Both
Effective response requires strong vertical lines in our organizations. Hierarchy provides the critical, unifying structure to the capacity of complex organizations. But effective response also requires strong horizontal relationships to put that capacity to work. We need to organize vertically and to work horizontally.
Donald F. Kettl, University of Pennsylvania
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Freestyle Sparring
Eric N. Smith, in Workplace Security Essentials, 2014
Background of Emergency Planning
The best emergency plan in the world will fail without leadership. Setting up the right structure to keep the response on track during a disaster or emergency is the first step to success. Fortunately, a great model has already been well tested and proved effective. The Incident Command System (ICS) is the structure developed that allows for flexibility while defining clear roles and functions to help navigate through a tough situation.
The ICS was first developed by the military and later adapted by crews fighting wildfires. As you can imagine, there were difficulties in coordinating response, allocating resources, and even planning what should be done. Crews were spread out across wilderness areas, each facing different challenges or needs. Multiple agencies were also involved, from local firefighters to sheriff's departments as well as groups of firefighters brought in from out of state or other areas. Information from aerial surveillance had to be analyzed, strategies developed, and then the right resources with specific goals sent to the various areas around the fire to help contain it and protect homes or forests.
The basic structure consists of an incident commander who is ultimately responsible for all decisions. The incident commander is directly supported by a team, including a safety officer, security officer, public information officer, and liaison officer. There are several sections, each one in turn supported by a section chief who reports to the incident commander. The sections include operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration.
The incident commander has the overall responsibility to determine what goals need to be accomplished and the steps to reach those goals. The liaison officer coordinates with any external agencies or groups that may be involved or have asked for help, such as the local office of emergency management or local police. The safety and security officers may be combined into one role and are, as the name implies, responsible for the overall safety and security of those involved with the emergency response. The safety/security role is to identify any threatening situations that could jeopardize responders and make recommendations to adjust for risks. The public information officer, or PIO, is responsible for any media statements or communications, as well as internal communications to employees or affected groups.
Once the incident commander has outlined the overall objectives, the other sections each take on specific roles to achieve those objectives. The planning team is focused on information: what is happening around the organization or externally, as well as gathering information on what resources are available. The planning team takes that information to develop a timeline outlining what needs to be done in the immediate future as well as down the road, even into the recovery phase.
The logistics group is responsible for finding out what resources are on hand, where the resources are, or how to get them. A large piece of this often involves getting a labor team set up. Depending on the type of emergency and the response needed, a labor team can help by providing runners to get information to the right people in the midst of chaotic communications. The labor team may need to help move internal equipment, evacuate customers or patients, direct traffic, or secure the facility.
The operations team is responsible for the "doing." This team has to carry out the planned tasks and may be dependent on the supplies procured by the logistics team. This is where the rubber meets the road. If the emergency involves damage to a critical building, the operations team will be responsible for assessing and repairing the damage. Specific team members may include a cross section from across the organization, such as information technology personnel, especially if the disaster affects data servers or equipment. In a hospital, operations may be focused around clinical care, especially if the emergency is an influx of patients or involves the evacuation of patients to other care sites. The labor team put together by the logistics crew may be put to work in a needed role.
Next is the finance or administration section. This group is responsible for tracking expenses, purchases, payroll issues, time sheets, or any other item that reflects a cost to the organization. For example, during a blizzard, hospital staff may be forced to stay overnight to continue caring for patients. Nearby hotel rooms may be used to give everyone a chance to get some sleep and rest between shifts. The finance team tracks those expenses as well as who was working at what times. The administrative side also includes keeping a log of decisions made at the incident command level as well as collecting and keeping any related paperwork.
The Incident Command System is designed to be flexible. That means for some situations you may not need to assign a person to each and every role. For example, if the scope of an emergency is smaller or temporary, the same person may fill the role of the operations section chief as well as the logistics chief.
In law enforcement, the first police officer on a scene becomes the incident commander. His responsibilities include making sure the scene is safe, identifying what additional resources will be needed and what immediate goals need to be established, and beginning to work towards those goals. As other police officers arrive, he will assign them as needed, similar to how the operations chief would work. In short, the initial response and preliminary ICS may be one person and grow to include other officers, supervisors, and even other agencies, such as the fire department or paramedics.
Fire departments routinely use the ICS in an even more formal way. The initial fire truck on scene quickly becomes the command center and even uses that term as the radio identifier. Eventually, when a battalion chief arrives, that person becomes the incident commander and takes on that radio designation to provide continuity of communication for everyone in the field reporting back or requesting instructions from the incident commander.
The United States' Federal Emergency Management Agency has numerous free courses available online that help train individuals on ICS. These courses are a great way to get those in your organization familiar with the type of command structure that should be used to deal with emergency situations.
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Emergency Planning
Ernest G. Vendrell, Scott A. Watson, in The Professional Protection Officer, 2010
Vulnerability Analysis
Hazard identification, risk assessment, and impact analysis are important steps in the planning process, since many of the key decisions made relative to the emergency plan are based on this information. Many times this procedure can be accomplished by using a simple numerical rating system (scale of 1 to 5, with 1 as the lowest and 5 as highest) to list potential emergencies (such as fire, flood, terrorist attack, etc.), estimate the probability of each emergency occurring, assess the potential human impact (death and injury), property impact (losses and damages), potential business impact (loss of market share), and, finally, the strength of the internal and external resources that may be available (1 being weak resources and 5 indicating strong resources). Next, you would total the score for each potential emergency, taking into consideration that the lower the score, the better. Although somewhat subjective, the comparison will be of significant assistance in determining planning priorities. The following example helps to illustrate the process (Table 28-1) (FEMA, 2007):
Table 28-1. Vulnerability Analysis Chart
Type of EmergencyProbabilityHuman ImpactProperty ImpactBusiness ImpactInternal resourcesExternal resourcesTotalHighLowHigh ImpactLow ImpactStrong resourcesWeak resources5↔15↔15↔1
Note: The lower the score, the better.
Source: Adapted from FEMA's Emergency Management Guide for Business and Industry (2007).
The Incident Command System
Molino (2006) identified five common concepts relative to the control and management of emergencies. According to Molino, these concepts (referred to as the Five Cs of Command) form the basis of the Incident Command System (ICS):
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Command
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Control
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Communications
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Coordination
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Cooperation
ICS was developed in the early 1970s after a series of major wildfires in southern California. The fires affected all levels of government (federal, state, and local), and highlighted various recurring problems that prevented responding agencies from working together. In particular, determining who was in charge of the overall response effort, duplication of efforts, poor coordination due to no joint planning, lack of a common organization, and ineffective intra-agency communications, hindered the overall emergency response to the fires. ICS established an on-scene management system that would help responding agencies work together using a coordinated and systematic approach that can be used for all types of incidents regardless of size (Bullock et al., 2008; Canton, 2007; McEntire, 2007):
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Common Terminology: Common vocabulary is used instead of signal codes. Functional assignments are standardized and easily understood.
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Integrated Communications: To accommodate various agencies, a common communications plan is used with assigned frequencies.
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Unified Command Structure: The command structure expands when there is more than one responding agency, and all organizations share a common set of incident objectives and strategies.
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Unit Integrity: Typically, responding units are not broken up before being deployed. Most responders receive orders through their existing chain of command.
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Unity of Command: To avoid organizational confusion, every individual has a designated supervisor.
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Effective Span of Control: One supervisor for every 3–7 subordinates, with 5 being the optimum number.
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Modular Structure: Can expand or shrink based on needs.
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Comprehensive Resource Management: Human, material, and equipment resources are always checked in, and their status maintained at all times.
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Consolidated Action Plans: A single planning process, leading to one incident action plan.
The ICS structure is built around five major management activities or functions (McEntire, 2007) (Figure 28-4):

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Figure 28-4. Basic incident command system organizational chart.
(Adapted from U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008)
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Command: The incident commander (IC) determines strategy and objectives and is responsible for overall command of the incident. Three positions/functions work closely with the IC:
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Information Officer: Works with the media and releases information to the public as appropriate.
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Safety Officer: Monitors operations and advises the IC on all matters related to safety.
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Liaison Officer: Is the IC's point of contact with representatives of other organizations.
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Operations: Responsible for directing and coordinating all tactical operations to meet incident objectives.
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Planning: Responsible for all incident-related data (gathering and analyzing) as well as the status of all available resources.
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Logistics: Responsible for providing the necessary support (facilities, services, and materials) to meet all needs for the incident or situation.
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Finance: Responsible for on-site financial and administrative management, including monitoring and documenting all costs related to the incident. This is especially important for reimbursement by the federal government when there is a Presidential Disaster Declaration.
It is important for protection officers to understand how ICS works for several reasons. First, it is a relatively simple on-scene management tool that has proven effective in a variety of settings over the years, including the private sector. Second, any time there is a serious incident that requires public safety personnel from any level of government to respond, they will likely be using ICS. Consequently, understanding ICS, and being able to seamlessly fit into this management system in an effort to solving problems, would be advantageous for all of the entities involved in the incident.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS)
In recent years, the United States has been impacted by a number of devastating disasters. In particular, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, highlighted the need for a comprehensive national approach to incident management. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) provides a systematic, proactive, all-hazards approach that guides all levels of government, nongovernment organizations, and the private sector to work together to respond to, and manage, incidents of all sizes and complexity. NIMS is a template that works well with the National Response Framework (NRF), which provides the structure for national-level policy for incident management (FEMA, 2005).
Clearly, as we have seen over the years, the private sector plays a vital role in incident response. For this reason, the private sector should be incorporated into all facets of NIMS, and should prepare for all-hazards incidents that may affect their ability to operate. This is particularly important for private sector organizations that are part of the critical infrastructure, or those that have a role in emergency response. Moreover, those private sector organizations that play a role in emergency response are encouraged to become NIMS-compliant through various training programs offered by FEMA (2005).
It should also be noted that ICS is an integral part of NIMS. This is another reason why private sector organizations and protection officers may wish to have a thorough understanding of ICS and be able to apply the concepts readily in the event of a serious incident that will require a multi-agency response.
Emergency Operations Centers
An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) serves as a centralized area for the management of emergency operations. The EOC is where decisions are made by the emergency management team based on information provided by emergency responders and other personnel (FEMA, 2007).
The EOC can range from a dedicated, well-equipped center (comprehensive emergency communications capability including radio, telephone, fax, Internet access, computer, and television; self-sustaining power sources; bathroom, eating, and sleeping facilities for staff, etc.) to an ad hoc room that is used as circumstances dictate. Of particular importance is that an organization identifies its requirements ahead of time and establishes the type of arrangement that best suits its needs (FEMA, 2007; Nudell & Antokol, 1988).
Although the EOC should be near senior management, it should not interfere with everyday operations. In addition, an alternate site should always be selected ahead of time. Hawkes and Neal (1998) state that "an effective command center ready to respond to any emergency is a critical component of a headquarters security plan" (p. 54). They further contend that "a successful command center is the result of careful planning, clearly defined structure and job descriptions, and comprehensive training" (p. 54).
Media Relations
Procedures for dealing with the media are another important area that cannot be overlooked. When a critical incident occurs, the security manager will undoubtedly be pulled in many different directions. Faced with a considerable number of important tasks, the security manager may not view media relations as a primary concern. However, being prepared ahead of time to deal with the media can help an organization to get through the incident without the additional damage that can be caused by misinformation and speculation. In addition, the negative publicity that an organization receives as a result of a critical incident can have far-reaching effects. An organization's image and business can be adversely impacted. Litigation is bound to result as victims, the families of victims, employees, customers, and perhaps various interested outside parties will be seeking to lay blame and recover damages. Attorneys are bound to examine every newspaper account and TV report of the incident. They will, of course, be looking for statements from representatives of the organization for any admission or confirmation that the organization was in some way negligent (Gardner, 1997).
Nuss (1997) defines a crisis as " … an event requiring rapid decisions involving the media, that, if handled incorrectly, could damage the organization's credibility and reputation" (p. 1). He further provides a number of effective crisis communication steps that organizations should consider:
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Have a media plan
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Build a relationship with the media before a crisis strikes
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Train employees in crisis communications
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Maintain a good relationship with the media after [a] crisis
Cooperating with the media provides an organization with a number of important benefits that far outweigh the benefits of denying them access. In particular, it provides the organization with an opportunity to provide its side of the story. This is important since oftentimes the spokesman for the organization can release background information that may provide a different perspective on the situation. Furthermore, working with the media may prevent reporters from seeking out secondary sources that are typically less informed and more likely to misrepresent the organization. Consequently, it is far better to have the organization give an accurate statement of the situation as opposed to leaving it up to the reporter to locate an "informed" source, which can lead to speculation and misinformation. Saying "nothing" also has its own risks. Ignoring bad news will not make the incident go away and usually this tactic raises additional questions (Gardner, 1997).
FEMA (2007, p. 41) provides a number of important considerations for dealing with the media in an emergency:
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Designate a trained spokesperson and an alternate spokesperson
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Set up a media briefing area
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Establish security procedures
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Establish procedures for ensuring that information is complete, accurate, and approved for public release
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Determine an appropriate and useful way of communicating technical information
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Prepare background information about the facility
FEMA (2007, p. 41) also provides the following guidelines when providing information to the media during an emergency:
Dos
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Give all media access to the information
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When appropriate, conduct press briefings and interviews. Give local and national media equal time
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Try to observe media deadlines
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Escort media representative to ensure safety
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Keep records of information released
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Provide press releases when possible
Don'ts
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Do not speculate about the incident
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Do not permit unauthorized personnel to release information
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Do not cover up facts or mislead the media
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Do not put blame on the incident
It is quite evident that, although safety issues are always a top consideration, an organization cannot overlook the importance of having an effective crisis media relations plan in place and training protection officers with respect to their roles. This is critical, since the plan must be implemented quickly during a critical incident in order to provide accurate and timely information while safeguarding the reputation and interests of the organization.
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Emergency Preparedness
Tony W. York, Don MacAlister, in Hospital and Healthcare Security (Sixth Edition), 2015
Bomb Threat
As part of the EOP/ERP annexes, all healthcare facilities should have policy and procedures for handling a bomb threat. Prevention is the first step to be taken against a bomb situation. These steps are the same security safeguards that should be in everyday use to protect the organization against other security risks. In other words, the proper functioning of the day-to-day protection system is the first line of defense against the bomb threat. To be more specific, locking equipment rooms, switchboard rooms, utility closets, and storage areas reduces risk. Limited access, access controls, noting suspicious people and vehicles, and providing emergency equipment are all part of the everyday protection system. One of the most important aspects of properly managing a bomb threat is to specifically establish organizational authority. Authority and responsibility for handling the initial crisis must be designated to a position readily available 24 hours a day. This position should be the Incident Commander. Logical choices for this role might be the nursing supervisor, the house officer, or the security shift supervisor.
A bomb threat can be received in numerous ways. The most common method is by telephone, and the most common recipient of such information is the switchboard (PBX) operator. Telephone operators, and others who are likely to receive these calls, should be trained to keep the caller talking as long as possible and to ask key questions, such as where the bomb is located, when it will go off, why it was placed, what kind of bomb it is, and other questions that may keep the caller on the line. The person who receives the call should make notes or activate a recording device. Not all threats indicate a bomb has been placed somewhere in the facility. The threat may indicate a bomb "will be" placed in the facility. When this type of threat is received, access controls must be expanded, and the organization may decide to examine property being brought into the facility.
Bomb threat information received must be communicated to the designated authority within the organization, which in turn activates the EOP/ERP. The first step in the notification procedure must always be to notify the appropriate law enforcement authority. In most cases, the law enforcement authority and facility management will decide jointly the type and extent of search required. It is not practical, or possible, to conduct an all-out search in every case. An all-out search includes everything from checking every patient's belongings, to removing all suspended ceiling tiles and all ventilation grille work. It is presumed people who carry bombs are well aware of the danger of premature detonation, and therefore in most cases they will want to get into the facility quickly and to get out even more quickly—which generally precludes an elaborate hiding process. If sufficient organizational personnel are available, the search should be conducted by staff rather than by the police or fire department. The proper role of the outside support agencies is to assume control if a bomb or suspected bomb is located. Employees should conduct the search for two basic reasons. First, staff are in the best position to know what belongs and what does not belong in a given area. Staff are more knowledgeable of the layout of the facility, and either have the capability to enter locked or controlled areas or know how to obtain access.
The use of in-house personnel to search avoids unnecessary confusion and minimizes disruption. Experts believe bomb threat callers are frequently interested in stirring up as much activity and causing as much disruption as possible. Thus, one objective of a bomb search is to carry out the search in a smooth, routine manner, while taking every threat seriously. In bomb threat situations, the administrative person handling the threat may decide to advise only selected staff and patients. In general, patients should not be told of the problem unless absolutely necessary. Experience has shown patients often set off a chain reaction detrimental to the entire process. Patients may respond by calling their families. In turn, the family may decide to come to the facility or call the facility for detailed information. This reaction can tie up needed communications lines and hinder response capabilities.
Whether a search is full or partial, areas of responsibility must be assigned. Search personnel are assembled as a group so the search coordinator can relate to them the information received and assign specific areas to specific personnel. This information may also be communicated by telephone or through a public address system with a code term such as "Mr. Search" or "Code Green," or via electronic means. A complexity that must be taken into consideration is the staffing pattern of the facility. When all departments are fully operational, the facility can be more easily and quickly searched than when departments are closed and locked. During the nonoperational period, security, maintenance, and environmental services personnel may be assigned an expanded role in the search effort. Floor plans, divided into specific search areas, are used in some facilities. Personnel are given a map of the area for which they are responsible. In other organizations, these assignments are made from an administrative checklist that defines the areas. However the parameters of the search are defined, the person responsible for searching a given area must always report back to the command center when the search has been completed. The primary concern is for personal safety rather than property.
If the search produces a bomb or a suspected bomb, the cooperative efforts of security and public safety agencies come into play. Facility employees should never touch a suspected bomb. The investigation and removal of any suspect object is the responsibility of the public safety agency. Security's basic function is to seal off the area and to commence evacuation if necessary. The decision to evacuate rests with the hospital incident commander, working in cooperation with the public safety agency involved. A safe distance for evacuation is generally considered to be a 200-foot radius from the suspected object, including the floors immediately above and below.
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Who Does What
Nan D. Hunter, in The Law of Emergencies, 2009
The City Asserts Control and the Recovery Operation Commences
The City response began mere moments after the terrorist attacks on New York City. American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into One World Trade Center at 8:40 a.m. By 8:50 a.m. on September 11, the City, initially through the Fire Department, had established its Incident Command Post and had asserted control over the World Trade Center complex and the surrounding areas. The rescue and recovery efforts at the site were thereafter coordinated through the City Office of Emergency Management ("OEM"), with the Fire Department designated as the incident commander for the site, and with the City Department of Design and Construction ("DDC") assuming total control over all aspects of safety, construction, demolition, and cleanup activities at the site.
On September 12, 2001, the DDC set up a temporary command center at Public School IS 89 in lower Manhattan, immediately to the north of the World Trade Center site, and commenced daily meetings to organize rescue and recovery efforts. Of utmost concern to the DDC was securing the World Trade Center site and limiting access to the area. Together with other City agencies, including the OEM, the DDC established stringent protocols determining "not only who would have access to the site, but also how that access would take place and under what constraints." The City further enlisted the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the "Port Authority") to assist in maintaining the security of the perimeter and to report observed safety protocol discrepancies.
The City also engaged private contractors for the recovery effort. On September 15, 2001, FEMA confirmed that contracts could be awarded without need for competitive bidding under the emergency conditions existing after September 11. Requirements for competitive bidding having been waived, and pursuant to the Declarations of Emergency issued at the City, State and Federal levels, the DDC engaged [several construction companies] to provide the work necessary for removal and demolition services. … The efforts of [these] contractors were coordinated, and supervised, through the DDC at twice daily meetings held at the temporary command center, and by numerous visits to the worksite. By September 14, 2001, the DDC had divided the site into four quadrants with a primary contractor assigned as a "construction manager" for each individual quadrant. The primary contractors acted as supervisors for their individual quadrants, with responsibility for enforcing applicable regulations and ensuring compliance. …
In the initial days and weeks following September 11, the City and its contractors, together with public utilities, worked also to restore essential services to the City. The September 11 attacks resulted in the immediate loss of power to all of lower Manhattan and in the destruction of critical components of the gas and steam infrastructure. The Con Edison substations, which had been located directly beneath World Trade Center Seven, were destroyed by fire and by the building's ultimate collapse, resulting in a critical disruption of services to Lower Manhattan. Con Edison assumed sole responsibility for restoring electric, gas and steam services and related facilities that were damaged or destroyed due to the events of September 11. The Verizon Building, located at 140 West Street, also sustained severe structural damage, crippling the phone system. Other critical services, such as the transportation system running through the World Trade Center site, were also destroyed and disrupted.
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SLAM for Pedestrians and Ultrasonic Landmarks in Emergency Response Scenarios
Carl Fischer, ... Mike Hazas, in Advances in Computers, 2011
1.1 Application Overview
Although localization is becoming available for the general public and for businesses via widespread use of GPS receivers and commercial indoor location systems (e.g., Ubisense, Sonitor, and Ekahau), many solutions are not suitable for use by emergency responders such as firefighters. The conditions they work in are significantly more demanding than nonemergency environments. Darkness, smoke, fire, power cuts, water, and noise can all prevent a location system from working, and heavy protective clothing, gloves, and facemasks make using a standard mobile computer impossible. In the past decade, much research effort has been put into this challenging problem and a wide variety of ideas have been developed.
1.1.1 Scenarios
Location and navigation support is useful in many everyday situations but essential in emergency response scenarios. Teams need to be able to reach safety quickly if conditions become too dangerous, and the incident commander needs to keep track of where teams are. The simple task of finding one's way in a building becomes a challenge when there is little or no visibility due to smoke and power failure. The high levels of mental and physical stress add to the difficulty. Getting lost in a burning or collapsing building can have fatal consequences for both the rescue personnel and the evacuees as oxygen supplies run out and medical attention is delayed.
A report by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) [3] in the United States identifies "lost inside" as a major cause of traumatic injuries to firefighters. Reports by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) [4] also reveal that disorientation and failure to locate victims are contributing factors to firefighter deaths.
In case of a sudden increase in temperature, a firefighter may only have seconds to reach safety. They need to find the exit as fast as possible. In some cases, they may not be able to retreat along the same path due to a collapsed ceiling or floor. Alternative exits may be available but not clearly visible. When a firefighter radios a distress call because they are trapped or when someone fails to report back to the command post, the rescue team must be able to locate them. Even when situations are not immediately life-threatening, precious time can be wasted by searching the same room twice or failing to search another. The incident commander also needs to know elements of the building layout, where the team members are, and which parts of the building have been searched.
Several recurring recommendations from the NIOSH reports [4] explicitly highlight the need for a navigation and tracking system, and suggest some solutions1:
•
"train firefighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure";
•
"consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights, flashing strobe lights, hose markings, or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented firefighters to the exit";
•
"ensure that the Incident Commander receives pertinent information (i.e., location of stairs, number of occupants in the structure, etc.) from occupants on scene and information is relayed to crews during size-up";
•
"working in large structures (high rise buildings, warehouses, and supermarkets) requires that firefighters be cognizant of the distance traveled and the time required to reach the point of suppression activity from the point of entry."
•
"conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of firefighters inside structures";
In addition to the location and navigation requirements, other reports emphasize the need for reliable communication of interior conditions to the incident commander and for monitoring building stability. Temperature, smoke, sounds, and vibrations are all indicators of the progression of the fire and the stability of the building.
1.1.2 Current Practices
Firefighters have developed their own specific navigation practices for use in poor visibility. Details vary but overall the same ideas are used worldwide. The methods tend to be simple and practical, and the equipment is seemingly low-tech and very robust.
Following a hose is a simple method to find the exit through a dark or smokey building. If no hose is available, firefighters may use dedicated ropes called lifelines which connect them to a point outside the dangerous area. The other end can be left attached deep inside the building if a new team comes in to continue the search [5]. Additional lines may be attached to rings on the main lifeline to allow several firefighters to branch off in different directions, while remaining physically linked to the rest of their team. A series of knots on the main lifeline helps firefighters determine the direction and distance to the exit and can be used as reference points when radioing positions to the commander [6]. A flashlight left in the doorway of a room helps locate the exit and indicates to colleagues that the room is currently being searched, and a chalk mark on the door indicates that a room has already been searched [5,6]. Teams returning from a search mission sketch the layout of the building to assist the commander and any further teams.
All firefighters entering hazardous areas wear a Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) device attached to their breathing apparatus [7] (as cited by Ref. [8]). The PASS device sounds an alarm, if the firefighter does not move for a short time. At a fire scene, the sound of a PASS alarm is a signal that a firefighter is in distress. By following the sound, the rescue team can locate that firefighter. While not strictly a navigation tool, thermal imaging cameras can also be used for finding people and seeing walls, doorways, and windows when vision is obscured.
Many firefighters are trained to search a dark room while keeping either their left or right hand in contact with the wall. This helps with orientation and provides a strategy for systematically exploring an unknown space [9].
Human contact and accountability are also essential. Searches are always performed in teams of at least two members who should avoid being separated [10]. During a lifeline search, one team member may remain at a fixed position to help with orientation and provide progress reports while their colleagues search further. Locations are reported as accurately as possible over the radio to the commander outside the building who keeps track of team locations on a whiteboard.
The Pathfinder system produced by SummitSafety2 consists of a handheld tracker and beacons which transmit powerful ultrasound pulses. Firefighters can use the tracker to locate a beacon placed at the exit, while rescue teams can use it to locate a beacon with a different frequency worn by a firefighter in distress. Ultrasound waves are blocked by walls but will find a path around corners and under doors; this path can be followed by firefighters. Smoke, heat, humidity, and audible sounds from the fire do not interfere with the ultrasonic waves and a directional receiver for ultrasound is a lot smaller than for audible sound. The tracker displays the amplitude of the detected signal on a bar graph so a firefighter can locate the direction of a beacon by scanning a 360° circle.
1.1.3 Constraints and Limitations
Although these methods become more effective with training, they are practical and simple to understand. However, they sometimes fail. A lifeline may become tangled in furniture, a flashlight may be buried under debris, and the temperature of the environment may make a thermal imaging camera unusable. But the principles behind these methods are familiar—the physical properties of a rope, the propagation of light, even the principle of thermal imaging. Failure is understood and even expected in certain conditions. The left hand method for finding an exit can also be misleading and a person can find themselves walking in circles around a large pillar or repeatedly visiting two or three rooms connected by several doors. These techniques are used to aid and support navigation rather than impose an inflexible method. Human error can occur especially during complex and prolonged incidents. Simple techniques such as taking notes (for the commander) or following a rope (for the search teams) are designed to reduce the mental load. As pointed out in the NIOSH reports, many improvements can be made by following procedures and through adequate training. But localization, sensing, and communication are all areas where embedded computers, body-worn sensors, and wireless sensor nodes could play a role if they can be adapted to the harsh conditions.
Navigation by sight is impossible when darkness, smoke, or dust limit visibility to less than an arm's length. Persons or objects that are out of reach can be passed unnoticed. The environment can change as ceilings, floors, or shelves collapse, as furniture is moved and doors are opened or closed by people searching for an exit. The noise of the fire can mask PASS alarms, interfere with radio conversations, and make cries for help difficult to locate.
High-tech systems are generally not adapted to these conditions. Propagation of radio, ultrasound, and laser signals typically used for location is hindered by high temperatures, thick smoke, noise, gusts of air, obstacles, and falling debris. A report by the City of Phoenix Fire Department [11] analyses problems with radio communications inside buildings and identifies unreliable radio links as the cause of several injuries. Sensors deployed in the environment may be kicked, fall through the floor, or be buried. Firefighters may crawl or walk in unusual patterns, and body-worn sensors may lie at odd angles. In addition, there is the issue of presenting the right amount of information to the firefighter in an accessible way and ensuring that devices can be used in the dark with gloves. Finally, the casing and electronics of all devices must be made as robust as possible in the same way as PASS devices and radios to withstand rough handling and very high temperatures [8].
The FIRE project at UC Berkeley reports on some of the major difficulties in designing high-tech location systems for the emergency services [12]. Reliability is more important than high resolution or fast updates. Consistent room-level locations every 20 s are deemed more useful than finer resolution updates with higher probability of error. And the firefighters must be able to customize and service the equipment themselves to some extent. All this is key to acceptance of new technologies.
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GIS Methods and Techniques
Brian Tomaszewski, ... Jacob Hartz, in Comprehensive Geographic Information Systems, 2018
1.25.2.1 Disaster Management and Serious Gaming
In the field of disaster management, serious games are being introduced as a means of eliminating the shortcomings of traditional training tools such as simulated drills. In addition to lacking realism, these drills often require large investments of time and money to arrange and execute. These shortcomings make these training tools impossible to repeat in short amounts of time. Recent introductions of serious games into the disaster management training routine allows upcoming first responders to optimize their training by achieving the most effective results with less of a need to invest great amounts of time and money. The following are reviews of several released serious games that include either a mapping tool or a GIS component as well as common mechanics seen within these games.
Many existing serious games in disaster management include a GIS component as a means of providing spatial awareness in the gaming scenario. The presentation of maps, context for the scenario, specific locations, and the ability to interact with the environment are all examples of spatial awareness as presented in a gaming context. A gaming scenario that presents this exceptionally well is Cˆ3Fire, a microworld simulation for emergency management (Granlund, 2001). Using the tool both as a means for the leader to communicate to his personnel and as a means for the personnel to keep record of their findings, this game relies heavily on the graphical interface that a GIS is capable of providing in order to enhance their communications between players. Granlund (2001) revealed in his findings that those participants who selected to use the GIS and mapping tools provided to them had a higher rate of accurately identifying fires than those who simply chose to use the diary and standard communication tools. He elaborated as well by stating that the data from the GIS tool were much more beneficial for debriefing of the game since it provided the instructors with quantitative data rather than just simply qualitative feedback.
Several other disaster management games effectively provide spatial awareness without necessarily including real GIS functions. BreakAway Ltd. (2012) presents Incident Commander (Fig. 2), a game created in conjunction with the US Department of Justice, that also considers spatial context for their game, giving users a map of the surrounding area where the disaster is located. As people work through the situation, they are able to reflect on the context of the emergency and make decisions based on what's present in the area.

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Fig. 2. Screen shot of Incident Commander from https://youtu.be/Gc1CnfQKkZc.
Hazmat Hotline uses maps in a slightly different way, still giving context to their users, but on a much more local level (Schell et al., 2005). Giving them locations of victims, of the source of the hazardous material, and of their crew, this game allows users to think about how to best handle the situation, given where everything is located in relation to each other.
Although GIS and spatial components are critical components of disaster training serious games, there are other factors seen within released games that strengthen a game's viability as a training tool. One of these factors is the inclusion of a stress component to portray the reality of the situation at hand. There are several ways to address the stress component within a gaming context, one of which is using time as a key game mechanic. Haferkamp et al. (2011) demonstrates how each is portrayed within the game, DREAD-ED. DREAD-ED works based on limited time for team discussion and decision-making, giving the team between 30 and 45 min to reach a decision. To introduce a stress component as well, the game displays four scales to the players which change based on decisions they make to give real-time feedback after every more. Both poor and wise decisions come with feedback. The tactical decision games created by Crichton and Flin (2001) reflect upon similar components, allowing only an hour and a half for participants to completely work through their game, and introducing contingencies throughout the entire duration. The time component emphasizes the need for emergency responders to act quickly in light of a disaster. In addition to a time limit, stress is also factored into serious games through the inclusion of an unpredictable factor. Created in conjunction with VSTEP and several agencies around Europe, RescueSim is a flexible gaming environment that is controlled strictly through an instructor toolbox (VSTEP B.V., n.d.). The instructor not only creates the original scenario that will be presented to the players but also is capable of changing the weather in real time, showing the progression of an incident as it would look in real life, and introducing secondary events off of the primary one. Each of these changes is not known or able to be predicted by the players. SPOEL, a virtual environment created for the management and training of mass evacuations, allows for stress to be portrayed in a slightly different manner, working with the changes in human behavior as well as resource distribution and management as their primary sources of stress (Kolen et al., 2011). Victims within the game are able to change their opinions and actions based on media and decisions of the emergency crews. Road systems are also a limited resource, as they are capable of degrading within the game, or becoming too congested to use as viable evacuation routes.
Another component present in released disaster management games is the use of news stories or information recaps within the game scenario. Information provided to the players throughout the game scenario is another crucial piece to their ability to fully understand about what is going on as the incident revolves around them. IMACSIM provides this through use of waypoints (Benjamins and Rothkrantz, 2007). As the users make their way through the simulated environment they are able to visit numerous waypoints which provide information on the current state. These waypoints are flexible with scenarios, meaning that they can fit to a variety of different conditions and emergencies, and they are also able to accurately reflect any changes that occur throughout game play. Disaster in my Backyard also takes advantage of the opportunity to introduce information throughout the game, using QR codes and victims as the information source (Meesters and van de Walle, 2013). Set up as a live walk-through game, this scenario is much more hands-on in their information presentation. As players make their way through from start to finish, they are able to interact with actors who are playing victims within the game, receiving various amounts of information as they interact with them. Similarly, participants are also given an app which allows them to interact with QR codes that are placed throughout the game environment. These QR codes contain relevant information and allow communication between people as the game plays out.
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